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RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY: THE COGNITIVE 
PENETRABILITY OF RELIGIOUS PERCEPTION
Hamid Vahid
Philosophical responses to religious diversity range from outright rejection 
of divine reality to claims of religious pluralism. In this paper, I challenge 
those responses that take the problem of religious diversity to be merely an 
instance of the general problem of disagreement. To do so, I will take, as my 
starting point, William Alston’s treatment of the problems that religious di-
versity seems to pose for the rationality of theistic beliefs. My main aim is to 
highlight the cognitive penetrability of religious experience as a major source 
of such problems. I conclude by examining the consequences of cognitive 
penetration for the reliability of the monotheistic doxastic practice.
My aim in this paper is to address a neglected difficulty for the rationality 
of religious belief: the cognitive penetrability of religious experience. My 
main contention is that recent discussions of the rationality of religious 
belief have heavily focused on the output side of the religious belief for-
mation—epistemic consequences of religious diversity—at the cost of 
ignoring its input side—for example, the experiences on the basis of which 
religious belief is formed. If it turns out that religious experience can be 
cognitively penetrated, this will have serious implications for the epistemic 
significance of religious diversity. The cognitive penetrability thesis says 
that just as perceptual experiences influence our beliefs and desires, our 
cognitive states can also affect our perceptual experiences by causally 
influencing them in an internal way. Accordingly, an agent’s background 
states can influence the content of her perceptual experiences. This means 
that experiences can have rationally assessable etiologies which, under 
certain circumstances, can downgrade their epistemic force. The cognitive 
penetrability thesis equally holds for religious experiences, and so the 
suggestion is that, in addition to the standard ways in which religious di-
versity is said to threaten the rationality of religious belief, one should also 
look to the phenomenon of cognitive penetration as another significant 
source of that threat.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 1, after some introductory 
remarks, I elaborate on the bearing of the input/output distinction on the 
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question of the epistemic significance of religious diversity, followed by 
some general observations about the phenomenon of cognitive penetra-
tion and its relevance to that question. To emphasize this point, and to 
connect to the literature on the subject of religious diversity, I shall ex-
amine, in Section 2, some shortcomings of William Alston’s response to the 
issue of religious diversity while also highlighting his recognition of the 
epistemic relevance of the input side to religious belief, namely, religious 
experience to its rationality. Section 3 explains how the phenomenon of 
cognitive penetration can be seen as a significant source of the threat to the 
rationality of religious belief presented by religious diversity. I conclude 
by examining the consequences of cognitive penetration for the reliability 
of the monotheistic doxastic practice.
1. Religious Diversity and Its Possible Epistemic Consequences
According to some well-known accounts of the epistemology of religious 
belief, just as we can talk about the justification of perceptual beliefs in 
terms of the reliability of the practices of forming beliefs on the basis of 
sensory experience (SP), we can also talk about the rationality of beliefs 
that result from belief-forming practices that involve religious or “mys-
tical” experience (MP).1 Accordingly, the question of whether the beliefs 
produced by MP are justified turns, at least in part, on the question 
whether MP is reliable. Despite their initial similarities, however, SP has 
features that are lacking in the case of MP, features that, though failing to 
establish SP’s reliability, are nevertheless signs that it is a reliable practice. 
There is, in particular, a feature of SP whose absence seems to poses a 
serious problem for the claim about the rationality of engaging in MP. The 
feature in question concerns the fact that people, no matter which cul-
ture they belong to, make use of the same conceptual schemes to objectify 
the content of their sense experience. But when it comes to MP, we find 
ourselves confronted with a plurality of incompatible mystical doxastic 
practices which often yield incompatible doxastic outputs in virtue of in-
voking different conceptual schemes.
This is, of course, an instance of the well-known problem of religious 
diversity, and it appears to undermine the reliability of MP. Consider, for 
example, the different ways in which Buddhists, Muslims and Christians 
express their experience of encountering God, or the Ultimate, in their 
lives. Accordingly, we will have to recognize as many mystical doxastic 
practices as there are different conceptual schemes. The existing responses 
to the problem of religious diversity constitute a spectrum from skeptical, 
anti-realist to realist, religion-friendly explanations as to why diversity 
obtains. An extremely skeptical response states that the best explanation 
of diversity is that there is no objective reality with which people strive 
to come into contact. A less extreme skeptical way of responding to the 
problem is to see religious diversity as arising not from the absence of any 
1For example, Alston, Perceiving God.
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objective reality but from the unreliability of MP. The end result, however, 
is the same: Religious beliefs are epistemically unjustified.
Two major trends emerge from the realist, religious-friendly responses: 
exclusivism and religious pluralism. An exclusivist is someone who thinks 
that the religious perspective of only one basic theistic system is the truth 
or is closer to the truth than all its rivals.2 A religious pluralist, on the other 
hand, denies that any theistic system enjoys a privileged position vis-a-vis 
truth but also suggests a positive account by which to explain religious 
diversity. Inspired by the Kantian distinction between the phenomenal 
and the noumenal, John Hick, for example, has proposed to distinguish 
between the Real (or the Ultimate) and the various ways in which it is ex-
perienced and to which people respond within various cultural systems.3 
Just as for Kant the noumenal world exists independently of our concep-
tions of it, the Real is also an independently existing being which appears 
differently depending on which conceptual scheme or cultural tradition 
one utilizes to grasp it. But, as a number of philosophers have pointed 
out, it is far from clear that Hick can consistently claim that the Real can 
be experienced through our religious concepts while maintaining, at the 
same time, that it is “the unexperiencable ground of that realm [of human 
experience].”4 Hick, then, succeeds in diminishing the impact of religious 
diversity on the rationality of religious beliefs only at the cost of radically 
restructuring their contents.
Religious diversity can challenge the rationality of religious belief in 
a number of ways. Some of these challenges are epistemic while others 
involve non-epistemic considerations. In the first group, one can mention 
the challenge from religious disagreement (to be discussed later). There 
is also the probabilistic challenge from religious pluralism which holds 
that if, say, a Christian takes his Trinitarian belief to be more probable 
than each of the alternatives in other religions, the combined probability 
of these alternatives still outweigh that of the belief held by him.5 Another 
challenge concerns the common thought that religious beliefs are highly 
contingent depending on factors (e.g., who our parents are, which people 
we have met in life, which culture we were brought up in, etc.) that are 
not truth-conducive. So we could have easily ended up having different 
religious beliefs.6 There is also the non-epistemic “explanatory” challenge 
2It has, for example, been claimed that a Christian can reasonably ignore the claims of 
other religions unless it can be proved objectively that the upholders of such claims are on 
equal epistemic footing, that is, that they are his or her epistemic peers (Plantinga, Warranted 
Christian Belief). In response, it has been objected that one can also move in the opposite 
direction by shifting the burden of proof to the exclusivist and claim that practitioners of 
other religions are epistemic peers unless the exclusivist can demonstrate objectively that 
this is not the case.
3Hick, An Interpretation of Religion.
4Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 242.
5Schellenberg, “Pluralism and Probability.” For a reply see Plantinga, Warranted Christian 
Belief.
6See, for example, Bogardus, “The Problem of Contingency.”
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which is more concerned with the origins of diversity. The idea is that 
once it is assumed that a particular religious view is true and that God 
wants everyone to believe that view, we face the question of why there are 
so many competing religions in the world.7
All of these accounts of the challenge religious diversity for the ratio-
nality of religious belief have something in common: their heavy focus on 
the output side of the religious belief formation, the beliefs. What they 
seem to neglect is its input side. Consider one prominent sort of input: reli-
gious experience. To explain, recall that mystical perceptual practice (MP) 
was articulated as the practice of forming output beliefs about the Ultimate 
in response to inputs to the practice consisting of the experiential aware-
ness of the Ultimate. Depending on where the emphasis is laid, either on 
the output side or the input side, the problem of religious diversity would 
assume different kinds of significance. If we focus merely on the output 
side of various forms of MP, highlighting their doxastic incompatibility, 
then religious diversity will be best viewed as an instance of the general 
problem of disagreement. If, on the other hand, emphasis is laid on the 
input side, religious experience, then the problem assumes a whole new 
dimension. And it seems that it is the input side that distinguishes MP 
from SP. After all, disagreement is also rife in SP.
This point is also noted by Alston who, when highlighting how MP 
differs from SP, points out that “whereas SP presents virtually an identical 
picture in these respects [subject matter, conceptual scheme and overriding 
system] across cultures, this is by no means the case with MP.”8 Alston 
particularly singles out the role of conceptual schemes in objectifying the 
content of mystical perceptual experience. While our perceived environ-
ment is, for the most part, conceptualized in the same way by people from 
different cultural backgrounds, adherents of various religious traditions 
differ enormously in their depictions of Ultimate Reality.
Now, if it turns out that one’s antecedently held religious beliefs (and 
emotions, etc.) can infiltrate one’s religious experiences, this might impact 
the epistemic status of the resulting beliefs (which can either be new or 
updated beliefs). When experiences are thus affected, they are said to be 
cognitively penetrated. The phenomenon of cognitive penetration has re-
ceived a lot of attention in recent epistemology. Its significance is best seen 
in the context of the foundationalist accounts of the structure of percep-
tual justification and their distinction between basic and non-basic beliefs 
with the former acquiring their justified status directly from experience. 
Although the distinction between basic and nonbasic beliefs helps to bring 
the regress of justification to an end, it also underscores the question of 
how basic beliefs acquire their justification from non-doxastic states like 
perceptual experience.
7Marsh and Marsh, “The Explanatory Challenge of Religious Diversity.”
8Alston, Perceiving God, 188.
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A popular recent view of the conditions of perceptual justification, 
known as “dogmatism,” holds that the justification conditions of per-
ceptual beliefs merely involve experiences with the same content.9 The 
dogmatist view has, however, come under fire due to the (alleged) cases 
of cognitive penetration of perceptual experience.10 The cognitive penetra-
bility thesis says that just as perceptual experiences influence our beliefs 
and desires, our cognitive states can also affect our perceptual experiences 
by causally influencing them in an internal way (in the sense of being 
contained entirely within the subject). It is further claimed that cognitive 
penetration downgrades the epistemic status of perceptual experience, 
thereby diminishing its justificatory power.
Focusing on the phenomenon of cognitive penetration can illuminate 
an important angle on the epistemic significance of religious diversity that 
the aforementioned accounts have ignored. To motivate the relevance of 
the phenomenon of cognitive penetration to the debate, I shall examine 
Alston’s response to the challenge of religious diversity and show why 
it falls short. Such a detour is instructive because, while Alston clearly 
recognizes the importance of the input side of the religious belief forma-
tion to the question of the epistemic significance of religious diversity, he 
chooses, in his account, to focus instead on the output beliefs, thus, failing 
to bring out the epistemic implications of his insight.
2. Alston’s Response to the Problem of Religious Diversity:  
The Significance of the Input
Alston’s main claim is that it is rational to engage in MP while acknowl-
edging that we have no non-question-begging grounds for determining 
which particular form of MP is reliable. He points out, however, that 
while there is a common procedure for deciding between the competing 
alternatives in intra-practices in SP, such as weather prediction, there is no 
such procedure in the inter-practice case of MP where distinct perceptual 
doxastic practices not only differ in terms of their conceptual schemes but 
also in their doxastic outputs. This asymmetry between intra-practice and 
inter-practice cases shows that there is no reason why, say, a Christian 
should lose her justification for her pertinent religious beliefs in the face 
of an unresolved incompatibility. Alston emphasizes, however, that what 
grounds the justification of such beliefs is not just the mere fact that var-
ious forms of MP have not been shown to be unreliable.
To explain, he notes that just as the practitioners of SP, which has proved 
itself by its “fruits,” namely, enabling the perceivers to deal competently 
with their environment, are justified to continue forming perceptual 
beliefs accordingly, even if they lack non-question-begging grounds for 
9See, for example, Pryor, “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist” and Huemer, “Compassionate 
Phenomenal Conservatism.”
10See, for example, Siegel, “Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification” and “The 
Epistemic Impact.”
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showing their accuracy, so are the practitioners of MP when forming their 
appropriate beliefs. Take someone who uses Christian practices of basing 
beliefs on mystical experiences (CMP) to form her Christian M-beliefs. It 
would be rational for her to do so if, as it turns out, CMP receives significant 
forms of self-support in terms of the fulfillment of God’s promises within 
that practice such as growth in sanctity, peace, love and other “fruits of 
the spirit.”
It seems questionable, however, that Alston’s introduction of the 
self-support factor, understood in terms of the practical payoffs of reli-
gious beliefs, can help such beliefs sustain an epistemically rational status. 
At best, the payoffs of such practices confer practical rationality or justi-
fication on their doxastic outputs. Indeed, in an earlier part of his book, 
Alston emphasizes that he is “taking significant self-support to function 
as a way of a strengthening the prima facie claim of a doxastic practice to 
a kind of practical rationality, rather than as something that confers prob-
ability on a claim to reliability.”11 It is thus puzzling that, in the chapter on 
religious diversity, he seems to think that he has established the epistemic 
rationality of religious beliefs:
Given the “payoffs” of the Christian life of the sort just mentioned, one may 
quite rationally continue to hold that CMP does serve as a genuine cognitive 
access to Ultimate Reality, and a trustworthy guide to that Reality’s relation 
to ourselves, even if one cannot see how to solve the problem of religious 
pluralism.12
Still more puzzling is the fact that, by Alston’s own admission, only one 
form of MP is genuinely reliable. If so, it is not clear how Alston could 
claim that it is possible to rationally engage in all such practices in an 
epistemic sense of that word. What has gone wrong?
The first thing to note is that, despite recognizing the important role of 
conceptual schemes in shaping and objectifying the content of mystical 
experience, in his official account of the epistemic significance of religious 
diversity, Alston chooses to focus on the output beliefs and their “internal 
support.” But, if that is where the emphasis is to be laid, there would seem 
to be an easier route to establishing Alston’s desired conclusion, namely, 
by seeing the problem posed by religious diversity as a special case of 
the more general problem of disagreement. Indeed there are passages in 
Alston’s book chapter on religious diversity where he appears to see the 
problem as a problem of (religious) disagreement. For example, he says 
that “any genuine cognitive contact with reality will yield agreement, 
and we can measure its reliability by the extent of agreement.”13 Or, more 
pointedly, to show how religious diversity might diminish the rationality 
of engaging in CMP, he gives an example in which different people give 
11Alston, Perceiving God, 174.
12Alston, Perceiving God, 276. Note that having “genuine cognitive access to Ultimate Re-
ality” constitutes an epistemic context.
13Alston, Perceiving God, 267.
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conflicting sense-perceptual report of a car accident where there is no neu-
tral ground on which to decide which account is correct. He then notes the 
following:
[A particular eyewitness who] is confronted by several accounts that di-
verge from hers should drastically reduce her confidence in her own. Here it 
seems clear that the existence of these uneliminated conflicting alternatives 
nullifies whatever justification she otherwise would have had for believing 
that the accident was as she took it to be.14
Indeed, Alston’s defense of the rationality of engaging in CMP can be seen 
to parallel a particular argument for a similar position in the disagreement 
controversy.
The fundamental questions in the disagreement debate consist of 
whether we can reasonably maintain our beliefs after becoming fully 
aware of each other’s views, and, further, whether we can also have mutu-
ally recognized disagreement.15 Current responses to these questions have, 
in general, formed a spectrum at one end of which sit the so-called “con-
ciliatory” views and at whose other end are the “steadfast” views.16 While 
the conciliatory views require us to make doxastic conciliation when faced 
with an epistemic peer who holds a different stance on a particular subject, 
the steadfast views allow us to maintain our confidence in our relevant 
beliefs. It is arguable that intellectual humility requires that the steadfast 
views have the resources to answer the second of the above questions in 
the positive.
Accordingly, one can see Alston as defending a version of the steadfast 
view where the practitioners of the world religions can rationally hold 
on to their views. In fact, the dialectic for his reasoning closely resembles 
that of an argument that Peter van Inwagen once suggested in support of 
his version of the steadfast view.17 Van Inwagen suggested that it would 
be reasonable for him to stick to his views on free will after he and David 
Lewis (who holds a different view) are fully apprised of their reasons and 
arguments because he is in possession of some “incommunicable insight” 
or intuition that Lewis, for all his acumen, lacks.
Alston can also be seen to be treading a similar path. Recall Alston’s 
appeal to the notion of “internal support” for mystical doxastic prac-
tices and his contention that the discernment of the spiritual fruits of a 
particular doxastic practice is open only to those who participate in that 
practice. We can now see that “spiritual fruits” for Alston plays a similar 
role that played by “incommunicable insights” for van Inwagen. Alston, 
however, differs from van Inwagen in one respect. Unlike the latter, Alston 
recognizes that other mystical doxastic practices also enjoy such internal 
14Alston, Perceiving God, 271.
15See, for example, Feldman, “Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement.”
16See, for example, Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement” and Elga, “Reflection 
and Disagreement.”
17Van Inwagen, “It is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone.”
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support. To put it differently, while Alston recognizes the possibility of 
mutually recognized reasonable disagreement in addition to reasonable 
disagreement, van Inwagen only recognizes the latter.18 But if the problem 
of religious diversity is to be seen as merely an instance of the disagreement 
controversy, there is a much easier route in arriving at an Alston-style 
steadfast view. To resist the conciliationist pressures that disagreement 
exerts, one could simply dispute the claim that the parties to the dispute 
are epistemic peers by either denying that one can determine the epis-
temic credentials of the purported peers or by denying that they share the 
same body of evidence.19
The preceding considerations can provide the basis of a steadfast view 
in the face of religious diversity along the lines advocated by Alston 
without confounding the situation with issues involving practical ratio-
nality.20 But is the problem of religious diversity just an instance of the 
problem of disagreement, namely, religious disagreement? For if it were, 
Alston could no longer single out, as we saw, the problem of religious 
diversity as a problem peculiar only to MP for disagreement is also rife 
in SP. One possible way of defending Alston’s claim about the peculiarity 
of religious disagreement is to look at its sources, not in the context of 
philosophical discussions but, in the context of the inter-practice of MP 
and the various conceptual schemes it involves. Indeed, there are passages 
in Alston’s book where he seems to be doing just that. Since I am going to 
defend a similar approach, it is worth briefly recounting what he says in 
order to connect the conclusions of this part of the paper to the positive 
view that will subsequently be developed.
Alston, as we have seen, is quite cognizant of the fact that while people 
with different cultural backgrounds conceptualize their shared perceived 
environments more or less in the same way, the practitioners belonging 
18Alston’s argument differs, however, from Van Inwagen’s for, while the sort of internal 
support that Van Inwagen receives from his “incommunicable insight” is epistemic, the kind 
of support that Alston receives from his “spiritual fruits” is, as we saw earlier, pragmatic. But 
the kind of rationality at stake in the disagreement debate is obviously epistemic. So, once 
again, it is not clear that Alston achieves his goal even when his argument is glossed in terms 
of the disagreement debate.
19The first alternative has two sources. First, one may argue that there are no disputes-in-
dependent ways of assessing the epistemic credentials of those who are party to religious 
disagreements. Moreover, one can deny that the credentials that are often emphasized by 
religious traditions are generally easily identifiable. As for the second alternative, one could 
argue that, unlike one’s sensory experiences, the content of religious experiences cannot be 
communicated by means of verbal testimony since, by hypothesis, Ultimate Reality is re-
sponded to, within various religious doxastic practices, through one’s peculiar conceptual 
and interpretive schemes. Moreover, even in those cases where the report of mystical experi-
ences more or less overlaps, the verbal report may fail to reflect the intensity or the veracity 
of those experiences which are directly proportional to their probative force.
20I am suggesting only that since Alston is focusing on the output beliefs, he could help 
himself with the resources of the steadfast view to arrive at his desired conclusion. As long 
as CMP can provide the required “internal support,” a Christian is within her rights to stick 
to her views. Of course, it is a further question whether the steadfast view is eventually 
coherent, especially if it also wants to recognize the possibility of mutually recognized rea-
sonable disagreement.
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to different religious traditions conceive of the Ultimate in radically dif-
ferent ways. These differences exist even among theistic religions with 
their “contrasting emphases on God’s justice or love [and] quite different 
stories as to what God expects and requires of us, as to what his plans for 
us are, and as to his activities in history.”21 Alston then poses the following 
question: Even if we assume that, say, CMP is a genuine doxastic practice, 
does it allow us to form new beliefs on the basis of its experiential input? 
“It may be suspected,” he says, “that what the practice amounts to is just 
reading one’s prior religious beliefs into a cognitively different experiential ma-
trix, rather than forming new beliefs on the basis of experience.”22
To answer this question, Alston separates two concerns about the role 
of conceptual frameworks: (1) one’s antecedently-possessed conceptual 
scheme infiltrates one’s experience, and (2) one’s thereby fails to acquire 
new beliefs. As regards the first charge, it is, says Alston, quite innocuous. 
We typically make use of our familiar sensory concepts such as “houses,” 
“trees,” and so on in perceiving our environment. SP and MP are on a par 
as far as the intrusion of our background beliefs into our experiences are 
concerned. As for the second charge, Alston notes that religious beliefs 
often pertain to God’s specific relation to the individual perceiver to the 
effect that He is, say, reproaching him, forgiving him and so on, which in-
formation the individual may have lacked before entering into perceptual 
contact with God. Sometimes the individual only gets to reaffirm her al-
ready held belief through her experience with a loving God. But this kind 
of updating is also present in SP with one of its effects being to strengthen 
one’s justification for the belief in question. In the quoted passages above, 
Alston comes very close to expressing one of the central ideas behind the 
phenomenon of cognitive penetration, though he fails to bring out its epis-
temic implications.
3. Religious Diversity and the Problem of Cognitive Penetration
As I have already remarked, the thought behind the thesis of cognitive 
penetration is that one’s belief system or antecedent mental states can 
affect the epistemic potential of one’s experience, thus undermining the 
justification that it would otherwise provide for the belief it gives rise to. 
If true, this would undermine accounts of perceptual justification (like 
dogmatism) that take the phenomenology of perception to underwrite 
its justificatory potential. To explain, it is a familiar fact that what we 
experience and perceive affect our beliefs, desires, and so on. What is con-
troversial is whether the influence goes in the opposite direction, that is, 
whether cognitive states (doxastic or nondoxastic) affect the contents of 
our perceptual states. The thesis of the cognitive penetrability of percep-
tion holds that cognitive states influence the contents of perceptual states 
such that it is nomologically possible for two subjects (or for a subject 
21Alston, Perceiving God, 191.
22Alston, Perceiving God, 205 (my emphasis).
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at different times) to have visual experiences that have different contents 
because of their beliefs, desires, or other cognitive states while their sen-
sory inputs, the state of their sensory organ, and the orientation of their 
attention are fixed.23
Of course, not every sort of effect on our experiences counts as a case 
of cognitive penetration. When I turn my head in the direction of a noise 
and consequently have a new set of experiences, that is not cognitive pen-
etration. Rather, the epistemologically important cases of the cognitive 
penetration of experience occur when some of the relevant factors such 
as the conditions of sensory organs and the orientation of one’s attention 
are fixed. Under these circumstances, it is possible for two subjects with 
different prior cognitive states to end up of having experiences with dif-
ferent contents.24 Perhaps the most common cases of cognitive penetration 
are those in which one’s desires affect one’s experiences by causally influ-
encing them. Consider, for example, the following scenario (I will call it 
Prospectors) where two gold prospectors, Gus and Virgil, are mining for 
gold. Gus is an expert while Virgil is a novice. When they look at the shiny, 
yellowish pebble in their pan, the nugget looks gold to both. However, 
for Gus, it is his knowledge of the identifying marks of gold that makes 
it seem to him as if the nugget is gold while, in the case of Virgil, it is his 
desire to get rich that brings about the seeming.25 It is obvious that Virgil’s 
case is one of wishful thinking as his seemings are caused by his desires 
(of course he is not aware that he is engaging in wishful thinking). Here 
are some further cases of cognitive penetration.
Angry-looking Jack. Jill thinks (falsely and without any reason) that Jack 
is angry with her. Her belief makes her expect Jack to look angry. Thus, 
when she sees Jack, her belief makes him look angry to her. If she could 
be convinced of the error of her prior belief, she would see that Jack’s 
posture is not one of anger.26
Sunset. In the evening, I view a reddish Sun over a river which looks 
like a beautiful sunset to me. If I did not know that it was evening or 
morning, it would not seem to me to be a sunset.27
Snake. My fear of snakes makes me more vigilant at detecting snakes 
in my path. On the other hand, if my fear is strong, my heightened 
awareness might make me see snakes almost everywhere.28
23Macpherson, “Cognitive Penetration.” This definition does not cover perceptual 
learning which is a different phenomenon.
24This has resulted in broader and narrower conceptions of cognitive penetration. In this 
paper, I shall work with both conceptions.
25See Markie, “Epistemically Appropriate Perceptual Belief.”
26Siegel, “Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification.”
27McGrath, “Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration.”
28Lyons, “Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability.”
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The fundamental question that such cases pose is what sort of epistemic 
influence can the psychological precursors of one’s perceptual experience 
(such as beliefs, desires, etc.) have on that experience. There is no doubt 
that in some cases of cognitive penetration (i.e., the “bad” ones), there is 
something epistemically defective about the beliefs formed on the basis 
of cognitively penetrated experiences. For example, in Angry-looking Jack, 
Jill’s false and unjustified belief that Jack is angry with her causes her to 
have the particular experience she has when she sees Jack. If she did not 
have that belief, Jack would not look angry to her. Her experience is more 
a reflection of her prior unjustified belief than a correct representation of 
the way things are. That is why we are disinclined to regard her belief 
about Jack’s attitude towards her formed (or updated) after seeing him as 
justified. Intuitively, when Jill’s antecedent belief impacts her experience, 
it would be unreasonable to expect the experience to provide support for 
that very belief.
Or, consider the case of a vain performer whose vanity makes him be-
lieve that the (neutral) faces he sees in the audience are all pleased with 
his performance. Again, since his experiences of those faces are influenced 
by his vanity, it would be unreasonable of him to take his experiences as 
providing justification for his view of himself. The situation described in 
these examples is not unlike a gossip circle in which a subject (S1) tells 
another subject (S2) that p which S2 believes but soon forgets where she 
has got it from. Suppose S2 then reports to S1 that p. In such circumstances, 
it would be odd for S1 to take S2’s testimony as further evidence for p be-
yond whatever evidence he had to start with.29 The cases described above 
suggest that the etiology places constraints on when experience can gen-
erate justification for the belief it gives rise to. So, cognitive penetration 
can impede the generation of justification by experience. That is precisely 
why such a view is at odds with the dogmatist theories of perceptual 
justification which claim that perceptual experiences provide prima facie 
justification for the beliefs they cause.
But not all such cases are epistemically pernicious. In some (good) cases 
(as in the case of Gus in Prospectors) the resulting experiences are enriched 
by receiving more information. For a different example, consider the case 
of a pine tree expert and a novice who are both looking at the same pine 
tree. It would be plausible to think that the expert’s belief that that is a 
pine tree is more justified than that of the non-expert since the expert’s 
background knowledge puts more information into his experience.
It would not be unreasonable to blame the etiology of experience in 
bad cases as being responsible for downgrading its justificatory force. Fol-
lowing Siegel,30 we call the thesis that the etiology of cognitively-penetrated 
29Siegel “Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification.”
30Siegel, “The Epistemic Impact.” We have seen how the cognitive penetrability thesis 
threatens the dogmatist view. This seems to suggest that perhaps it is the internalist char-
acter of justification (endorsed in dogmatism), requiring the justifiers to be introspectively 
accessible to the subject, that makes dogmatism vulnerable to the problem posed by the bad 
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experiences can remove some of their justificatory force, “The Downgrade 
Principle.” This claim is particularly convincing in cases where the pen-
etrating state is a desire, for everyone would grant that beliefs that result 
from wishful thinking are clear cases of unjustified beliefs. The idea is that 
just as, say, wishful thinking, fearful thinking, and prejudice can generate 
unjustified beliefs, so also wishful seeing, fearful seeing, and prejudiced 
seeing can generate epistemically downgraded experiences that lack some 
of the epistemic force that they would have had had they not been influ-
enced by desire, fear and prejudice.31
Before I turn to how the cognitive penetrability thesis bears on the 
problem of religious diversity and the epistemic status of religious be-
liefs, a few important points are in order. The first thing to note is that 
in the typical cases of cognitive penetration, the subject is not aware of 
the etiology of her experiences, or the epistemic status of her penetrating 
states and their causal roles. Her experiences are downgraded if they are 
influenced by her cognitive states such as beliefs, fears, desires, etc., in the 
way described, even if she is not aware of that influence. Otherwise, bad 
cases of cognitive penetration would be no different from the mundane 
cases of belief formation involving defeaters. In Angry-looking Jack, for ex-
ample, Jill does not know whether she is in a good or bad case. She need 
not even be able to determine which case she is in. Otherwise, there would 
be no puzzle to solve. The argument from cognitive penetration proceeds 
on the assumption that the subjects are unaware of the influence of their 
cases of cognitive penetration. In Angry-looking Jack, for example, Jill lacks conscious access to 
her (prior) belief’s causal role. But it is important to note that not all versions of internalism 
are negatively affected. There is, for example, a metaphysical version of internalism (“Men-
talism”) according to which only the internal states of an agent at a given time determine 
whether her beliefs are justified (see, for example, Conee and Feldman, “Internalism De-
fended”). Since mentalism remains neutral on the question whether these mental states need 
be accessible to an agent, the etiology of experience can be an epistemic difference-maker. 
Accordingly, if two people who happen to share the same kind of experience, but with dif-
ferent etiologies, cannot be epistemically identical because they have different total mental 
states.
31For the purposes of this paper I am going to assume the Downgrade Principle. Of 
course, like other substantial philosophical theses, the Downgrade Principle is controversial. 
But there are also a number of arguments in its support. One such argument (Vance, “Emo-
tion and the New Epistemic Challenge”) focuses on emotions because emotions are quite 
similar to experiences (in terms of having phenomenological character). On the other hand, 
it is quite plausible to think that beliefs and other attitudes can cognitively penetrate emo-
tional experiences. Furthermore, it is widely believed that emotions can be rational, justified 
or unjustified. Accordingly, when an irrational belief penetrate an emotional experience, it 
seems quite plausible to think that this emotion is not credible enough to justify the belief it 
give rise to because, by virtue of its etiology, the emotion itself is irrational. The analogy with 
emotions, thus, provides strong support for the Downgrade Principle. Another approach 
(Lyons, “Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception”) appeals to 
the reliability of the processes involving cognitively penetrated experiences themselves in 
order to argue for the principle. Finally, Siegel (The Rationality of Perception) has argued at 
length that perceptual experiences themselves could manifest an epistemic status i.e., be 
rational or irrational in the same way that the beliefs are. It is also worth noting that the 
ability of the Downgrade Principle to illuminate certain philosophical controversies such as 
the liberalism/conservatism debate, and, if the thesis of this paper is correct, the problem of 
religious diversity adds to its plausibility.
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cognitive states on their experience. Still, the etiology of their experiences 
can affect their justification power so that the experiences fail to rationally 
strengthen the subjects’ antecedent beliefs, fears, etc.
Moreover, as already indicated, the driving force behind the idea that 
the epistemic status of experiences can be adversely affected by how they 
are formed involves the sort of circularity that infects the subject’s transition 
from her antecedent states (beliefs, fears, etc.) to her experiences and then 
back to those states again. If one’s antecedent beliefs could influence one’s 
experiences, it would be odd to take those experiences to provide support 
for the beliefs in question. So it does not matter whether one’s antecedent 
states are well-founded or not. As long as our cognitively penetrated ex-
periences display the above circular pattern, they will be downgraded. To 
give an example of such a cognitively penetrated experience, suppose, on 
the basis of your lifetime experiences, you have formed the well-confirmed 
belief that bananas are yellow. Suppose you then encounter a gray banana 
which appears to you to be yellow. Here, it would seem unreasonable if 
you were to take your newly acquired experience as providing further 
support for your belief in the generalization that bananas are yellow. The 
resulting experience is certainly not on epistemic par with your previous 
experiences that accurately represented the color of the bananas you had 
perceived. The reason is obvious. Your experience is being epistemically 
downgraded because, by influencing your experience of the banana, your 
(well-founded) antecedent belief prevents you from seeing its true color.32
Let us now see how the preceding remarks can illuminate the question 
of the epistemic significance of religious diversity. For the sake of con-
creteness, as well as ease of management, I am restricting the scope of 
religious diversity to monotheistic mystical practices (MMP). My principal 
claim is that we can view the doxastic incompatibility that emerges from 
Jewish, Christian and Islamic mystical practices as having its origin in the 
phenomenon of cognitive penetration, and that whether or not such an 
incompatibility is an indication that MMP is unreliable depends on how 
widespread we take the doxastic incompatibility to be. Of course, given 
the preceding observations, only the bad cases of the cognitive penetra-
tion of religious experience pose a threat to religious belief.33 To explain, 
let us begin by considering what the good and bad cases of cognitive pen-
etration look like within MMP.
Angry/Forgiving God. As Alston remarks, one finds contrasting em-
phases on God’s attributes such as justice or love in different religions. 
Suppose then that there is a Muslim practitioner S1 (belonging to a very 
32For further arguments see Siegel, The Rationality of Perception.
33In this paper, I am following the lead of philosophers like Alston and indeed the whole 
tradition of reformed epistemology which emphasize the (relevant) similarities between 
perception and religious experience. If it is conceded that both perception and religious ex-
perience can confer justification on the beliefs they give rise to, there is no a priori reason to 
deny why the justification-conferring ability of religious experience cannot be undermined 
by its etiology in the way perception’s ability is.
232 Faith and Philosophy
strict sect within Islam) who believes that God is very unforgiving and 
strict. Suppose S1 commits a sin in circumstances over which he does 
not have much control. Subsequently he happens to have an experien-
tial awareness of God in which He seems to be very angry with him. 
Now consider S2, say, a highly liberal Muslim who takes God to be 
very forgiving. She commits a sin that she could avoid if she had been 
more diligent. Subsequently, she happens to have an awareness of God 
in which He seems to be very loving and satisfied with her deed. In 
both cases, S1’s and S2’s prior beliefs penetrate their mystical experience 
rendering their beliefs about God’s attitudes towards themselves un-
justified. In both cases, if they had been convinced of the falsity of their 
prior beliefs, they would not have perceived God in the way they did.
God Incarnate. Just as in SP, where one’s expertise and background 
knowledge can enrich one’s experience, thus, enhancing its justifica-
tion potential, one’s expertise in the field of religion can also achieve 
a similar result. Suppose two practitioners, S1 and S2, of two different 
religions, say, Christianity and Islam, come to have experience of God 
after following similar meditative techniques such as fasting, praying, 
abstaining from worldly pleasures and so on. After a sufficient lapse of 
time, our subjects come to have visions of God. S1 reports of “having 
‘seen’ how God is three persons or how the divine and human natures 
of Christ are united.”34 This is actually what Alston quotes St. Teresa as 
having witnessed in one of her mystical experiences. The Muslim, on 
the other, reports of having seen God as a unitary being and so on.
The first scenario can be considered a bad case of cognitive penetration 
where the relevant mystical experiences are downgraded by prior mental 
states resulting in unjustified output beliefs. The case of God-Incarnate is 
good or bad depending on whether it is the Christian’s or the Muslim’s 
background belief system that correctly represent God’s features. Which-
ever is correct, then the practitioner of that religion will be in the same 
position that the pine tree expert was when looking at the pine tree.35 Her 
background knowledge of God enriches her experiences of Him, thus, 
enhancing its justification potential. As for the cases in which one’s prior 
mental states bring about a shift of focus and attention, thereby, priming 
one’s sensory perception while navigating in one’s environment, one can 
refer to the spiritual techniques within different religions (like saying 
prayers, etc. that are interwoven with their main beliefs). The aim of such 
prayers and supplications is to prepare the believer for her spiritual quest 
by priming her mystical perception to detect more efficiently the signals 
that God sends her.
34Quoted in Alston, Perceiving God, 207.
35When a tree expert and a non-expert look at the same pine tree, the expert gets more jus-
tification to believe that the tree is a pine tree because the expert’s (phenomenally different) 
experience has the content x is a pine tree. Their routes to their experiences are different. See 
Siegel, The Rationality of Perception, 132.
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Now, if you look at the various forms of MMP, Jewish, Christian and 
Islamic practices, through the prism of the thesis of cognitive penetra-
tion, we get radically different results in regard to the epistemic impact 
of religious diversity than if the latter is merely taken to be an instance 
of the problem of disagreement, namely, religious disagreement. To see 
this, suppose there are two practitioners, S1 and S2, belonging to different 
mystical practices, who attribute two contradictory properties to God in 
response to their respective mystical experiences that are penetrated by 
different background beliefs. Let us further assume that one of these sets 
of background beliefs is false and unjustified resulting in the downgrade 
of the relevant experience while the other actually enriches the content of 
the subject’s mystical experience. S1 and S2 are subsequently apprised of 
their differences. The question is how we should evaluate the epistemic 
status of their beliefs.
To begin with, with a disagreement gloss on religious diversity, the 
situation is as follows. S1 and S2 are justified in engaging in their practices 
or in holding their incompatible beliefs before being apprised of their dif-
ferences as long as those beliefs are proper responses to their respective 
religious experiences. The question is whether S1 and S2 are still justified in 
holding their beliefs after they become aware of the fact of religious diver-
sity. On Alston’s account, they are still justified (though to a lesser degree 
than if there was no such diversity) in holding on to their beliefs. On my 
account, however, at least one of the practitioners is already unjustified 
in his belief (even before disclosure), since, by hypothesis, his experience 
is penetrated by a set of false and unjustified beliefs which detracts from 
the reliability of the faculties that produced his belief. His case is one of 
cognitive penetration where his mystical experience (downgraded as a 
result of being penetrated by his prior mental states) fails to justify his 
belief. Dogmatists or phenomenal conservatives, of course, take both S1 
and S2 to be justified in their beliefs on account of their seemings. But if 
the Downgrade Principle is correct, at least one of the seemings is being 
downgraded as a result of constituting a bad case of cognitive penetration.
Moreover, Alston, we may recall, formulated the problem of religious 
diversity for the rationality of religious belief in terms of whether reli-
gious diversity undermines the reliability of MP or MMP. On my account, 
such a connection is by no means necessary. While cognitive penetration 
also occurs in the sensory perceptual practice, it does not undermine the 
reliability of SP. Likewise, there is no reason why we should take the 
phenomenon of religious diversity, understood in terms of cognitive pen-
etration, to undermine the reliability of MP. What should be conceded is 
that if the phenomenon of cognitive penetration is widespread in sensory 
practices involving mostly bad cases, then that would render sensory per-
ception unreliable. Under these circumstances the sensory practice would 
yield mostly false beliefs. In other words, if most of the cases of perceptual 
belief formation turn out to be bad cases of cognitive penetration, that 
would constitute a strong case against the reliability of perception.
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It might be thought that MP differs from SP in this respect. Doxastic 
incompatibility is quite widespread among mystical doxastic practices. I 
am inclined to agree with this claim. But I have already confined the scope 
of diversity to monotheistic religions and it is by no means obvious that 
within this range diversity outruns agreement. Alston himself admits that 
here there is a great deal of doxastic overlap among theistic religions. I am 
inclined to think that the diversity within MMP—at least with respect to 
the core beliefs—is somewhat exaggerated. However, I am going to con-
clude my discussion with a conditional claim. If religious diversity within 
MMP is not as widespread as it is made to appear, then, with the cognitive 
penetration gloss on such diversity, MMP can still be regarded as reliable, 
just as sensory perception is regarded as a reliable practice despite the phe-
nomenon of cognitive penetration.36 Of course, there is still the problem 
of what religious practitioners should do in the face of disagreement. But 
that is a general problem that involves all sorts of belief-forming practices, 
sensory or non-sensory, religious or nonreligious.37
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